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control in E-commerce
by Robert Bond
The author describes how cryptography can be used to address 
modern business requirements.
WHAT IS CRYPTOGRAPHY?
Cryptography is the art of secret writing and has been 
used to conceal the contents of messages from potential 
adversaries for thousands of years. In ancient Greece, the 
Spartan generals used a form of cryptography so that they 
could exchange secret messages. The messages were written 
on narrow ribbons of parchment that were wound spirally 
around a cylindrical staff called a scytale. After the ribbon 
was unwound, only a person who had a matching cylinder 
of exactly the same size could read the writing on it.
Nowadays thankfully, the cryptographic methods used in 
secure e-commerce are considerably more sophisticated, 
and are used to support more than just the confidentiality 
of a message. Modern cryptography provides a basis for 
addressing many business requirements, including 
integrity protection, authentication and hence 
accountability, protection against repudiation, and 
detection of unauthorised copying.
Cryptography can in some ways be compared to the lock 
used on the door of a house or car and makes use of two 
components to function properly:
  the algorithm, which for the purpose of this discussion 
can be considered as being akin to the lock itself; and,
  the key, which is used to operate the lock.
Some normal, everyday locks are more easily broken or 
picked than others. Some locks have a more secure design 
than others, but if the key is left in an obvious place (under 
the doormat?), how effective is the lock? If the lock is 
constructed of high strength material but. has a relatively 
simple design, then it can easily be picked. Conversely, if 
the design of the lock is good, but it is constructed poorly 
or out of weak materials, then no matter how sophisticated 
or strong the key, the lock can easily be broken.
To ensure a strong and effective lock, the design, the 
material from which it is constructed and the key must 
satisfy criteria appropriate to the application to which it 
will be put. The key must also be protected from 
unauthorised use. A weakness in respect of any of these 
criteria, or a lapse of security in respect of the key, will 
render the whole set-up useless. It is the same with 
cryptography: the algorithm must be of a good strong 
design, the implementation of the design must be done 
well and without flaws, and both must be capable of 
withstanding attacks even when the attacker knows the 
design and implementation in detail, (remember, no security 
through obscurity). Just as with physical keys, cryptographic 
keys have to be protected from unauthorised use or the 
security of the whole set-up is compromised.
There are many excellent books that provide extended 
tutorials on cryptography, so only the salient points will be 
covered here. Modern cryptography falls into two main 
camps: symmetric or secret key cryptography, and 
asymmetric or public key cryptography. The main 
difference between the two types is that the former uses 
the same single key to both encrypt and to decrypt, while 
the latter uses one key to encrypt and another to decrypt.
When using secret key cryptography to protect a 
message or some other type of exchange, both the 
originator and the recipient of the message need to have 
access to the same key that is used for both the encryption 
and decryption operations. So somehow, that key needs to 
be distributed to where it is needed. Here we have a 
difficulty and in the past this was solved by distributing 
keys by what are called 'out of band' methods, such as, for 
instance, delivery by hand. This works well for low 
volumes of encrypted information, where the key may not 
need to be changed very often or for cases where the 
number of individuals with whom we wish to
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communicate is small (and therefore a small number of 
keys). When we wish to begin supporting secure 
e-commerce over the internet for instance, where the 
number of potential participants is unlimited, the key 
distribution and management problems associated with 
secret key cryptography really begin to surface. This is 
especially true in modern internet-based e-commerce 
situations, which can be dominated by communications 
with individuals with whom we have had no prior 
relationship.
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Figure 1 Symmetric or Secret Key encryption
Thankfully, we have a solution to this problem of 
securely distributing keys in public key cryptography. In 
public key cryptography, two keys are generated for each 
individual: a private key, (not to be confused with the secret 
key described earlier), and a public key. The individual for 
whom the key pair is generated must protect the private 
key from others (i.e. must keep it private). That person is 
free however, to distribute the corresponding public key as 
freely as he or she wishes, and via any secure or completely 
insecure mechanism.
So in the case that Bob wishes to send a confidential 
message to Alice, Bob retrieves Alice's public key (perhaps 
it is on a web server, or on other public access channels that 
we will discuss later). Bob can then encrypt the message 
using Alice's public key, and send the resulting encrypted 
message to Alice. Only the person with the corresponding 
private key is able to successfully decrypt the message, (in 
this case Alice), and so only Alice can decrypt and read the 
contents of the original message. Similarly, Alice could send 
a confidential message to Bob, (by using Bob's public key to 
encrypt the message so that only Bob can later decrypt the 
message using his private key).
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Figure 2 Public Key encryption
From the above illustrations, by just switching to public 
key cryptography, it would seem that we have solved the 
problems of key management and distribution that are 
associated with secret key cryptography. Apart from hugely 
reducing the number of keys that are required to support 
the secure exchanges of any given population of 
participants, we have also provided a workable method of 
distributing keys using insecure channels, but without 
compromising the security of our communications.
It would seem that since the advent of public key 
cryptography, we would have no further use for secret key 
cryptography. Unfortunately this is not the case, since public 
key cryptography is much slower to carry out than its 
secret key counterpart. If we were to rely solely on public 
key cryptography for protecting our personal or business 
exchanges, they would be reduced to a crawling pace. 
Consequently, it is normal practice to continue to use 
symmetric or secret key cryptography for encrypting bulk 
data such as the contents of an email, document, contract 
or invoice, etc. Public key cryptography is then used to 
securely deliver the symmetric or secret key to the 
recipient, where it is needed to decrypt the bulk data item. 
Under this scheme, randomly generated symmetric keys 
can be used for each session. In many electronic payment 
schemes and web access schemes for instance, these 
symmetric keys are also called session keys, for that very
WHAT ELSE CAN BE DONE WITH 
CRYPTOGRAPHY?
So far we have seen how private and business exchanges 
can be made confidential using cryptography. The very 
same technologies however, can be used to provide 
integrity protection and proof of origin. Remember that in 
public key cryptography, two keys are generated for each 
individual: a private key and a public key, and that for 
confidentiality protection, the recipient's private key is 
normally used to decrypt a message that has previously 
been encrypted with the corresponding public key.
Now let us suppose that again, Bob wanted to send a 
message to Alice, but this time he is not interested in 
keeping the message confidential, but is certainly 
interested in enabling Alice to determine if the message
o o
definitely came from Bob, and not from someone 
masquerading as Bob. In this case, Bob could encrypt the 
message with his private key, and then send the resultant 
encrypted message to Alice. Given the properties of public 
key cryptography, we know that if a message is encrypted 
with the public key, only the corresponding private key can 
be used to decrypt it. The converse is also true; if a 
message is encrypted with the private key, only the 
corresponding public key can be used to decrypt it. 
Therefore in this situation, Alice now knows that if she can 
successfully decrypt the message purporting to come from 
Bob, using Bob's public key, then the message could only
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have been encrypted using Bob's private key, and therefore 
the message must have come from Bob. In real life,o '
because of the poor performance of public key 
cryptography, these operations are normally performed on 
a piece of data that is much smaller than the bulk data item 
we are sending. This smaller piece of data, which is 
essentially a very large number, is called a hash or message 
digest, and has properties such that it is:
  infeasible to determine the input message from its 
digest;
  infeasible to find an arbitrary message that will produce 
a particular specified digest; and
  infeasible to find two different messages that willo
produce the same digest.
e.g. Bob
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Figure 3 Digital Signature
What this means is that if the message were to be 
changed by even one character or one bit, the message 
digest would suffer drastic change, (perhaps as many as 
half of the bits in the digest might be changed). By using 
this message digest instead of the whole message, Bob 
merely has to encrypt the message digest using his private 
key, and then send it along with the message itself. Alice
Ji O o
then re-computes the message digest from the message, 
decrypts the message digest that was sent to her by Bob 
(using Bob's public key), and compares the two values. If 
they are the same, Alice can be confident that the message 
did in fact come from Bob. We have in fact, applied what 
is known as a digital signature to the message (specifically in 
this case, Bob's digital signature).
Another property of this process is that if the two message 
digests are the same, Alice can also be confident that theO '
message was not changed en-route. Hence we have also
o o
provided some protection of the integrity of the message.
This is useful in cases where knowledge of whether theo
message has been tampered with is important, (for instance, 
altering the amounts on an invoice or payment).
MAKING THE TRANSITION FROM 
SECURITY TO TRUST
Although security is essential to be able to engage in 
electronic commerce, security by itself is not what we need 
to achieve. We need to be able to trust the infrastructure 
on which we depend to facilitate our private and business 
exchanges. We need to be able to trust other perhaps 
unknown, unseen parties with whom we may want to do 
business. Security and secure e-commerce technologies 
can go some way to enabling this trust; the rest depending 
on legal and regulatory safeguards, and on the reputations
of the individuals or commercial brands
concerned.
Remember the example from the 
previous section concerning proof of 
origin. In this example, Alice satisfied 
herself that the message originated with 
Bob because she was able to decrypt 
the encrypted message digest or hash, 
by using Bob's public key, (otherwise 
known as verifying Bob's digitalJ o o
signature). But was it Bob's public key? 
How can we be sure? As was 
mentioned earlier, public keys have the 
valuable property of being capable of 
distribution via any non-secure 
mechanism, such as merely being 
published on a website, or being 
emailed around to various interested 
parties. But let's imagine that some 
malicious or mischievous person 
wanted to masquerade as Bob. All he or 
she would have to do would be to 
generate a new key pair, and somehow distribute the 
public key of this new key pair with the announcement 
that it was in fact Bob's public key. Normal email has been 
found reasonably easy to fake, and successful attacks on 
websites to replace content are not uncommon, so it 
should be possible in many cases to substitute Bob's public 
key with another.
Now we have a situation where Alice can receive a 
message (or invoice, etc.) that purports to come from Bob. 
When Alice attempts to verify the digital signature on the 
message by using Bob's public key that she obtained from 
the website that Bob happens to use as a publishing agent, 
she finds that it does indeed verify the message as coming 
from Bob. Furthermore, the digital signature also shows 
that the message has not been tampered with, but is a 
faithful copy of that which was originally created by Bob. 
Our unknown malicious or mischievous interloper has 
successfully masqueraded as Bob.
Originator 
Public- 
Key
Actual 
Digest
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Here is a clear situation where we have elements of very 
strong security, but very little trust. We can protect 
messages to make them tamper-resistant, or to make them 
secret; we can even provide irrefutable proof that the 
message was generated using a particular private key when 
digitally signing the message. But we cannot be sure to whom 
the key belongs.
To make this transition from security to trust, we need 
to introduce a new element into our burgeoningo o
infrastructure: the X.S09 digital certificate, or to beo '
precise with respect to current developments: the X.509v3 
(for version 3) digital certificate.
Figure 4 The X. 509v3 Digital Certificate
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The sole purpose of this certificate is to bind an entity 
such as a person, company, department, machine, or 
software agent, etc., to a public key. It aims to do this 
indivisibly and in a manner that can be trusted. In order to 
do this, it borrows an idea that has been around for quite 
some time in the paper-based world: the trusted authority 
or trusted third party.
In simple terms, the X.S09v3 digital certificate is the 
electronic commerce world's analogue of the passport. 
Like the passport, it is issued by a trusted authority and 
binds you as an individual to an identity that can be 
recognised and verified by other agencies (the public key). 
On issuance, it confers certain rights and obligations on
' o o
you according to policies exercised by the issuing authority.
In a real passport, various checks on you are made by a 
trusted representative of the issuing authority to ensure 
that you are who you say you are, and thus establish a 
connection between you as an individual and the paper 
document that declares your identity. In the digital 
certificate world, a trusted representative of the issuing 
authority must be satisfied that you are who you say you 
are before a request is made to issue a digital certificate on 
your behalf.
In a real passport, the methods used to ensure the 
integrity of the binding between you and the paper identity
are such things as watermarks, seals, special paper and ink, 
etc. In the digital certificate world, the method used to 
ensure the integrity of the binding between an individual 
or other entity and the public key is the digital signature of 
the issuing authority.
Because the X.509v3 digital certificate uses and supplies, 
relying parties with the tools of cryptographic technology, 
it provides you with the ability to digitally sign documents 
or transactions, or to verify the signatures of others. It 
enables you to make documents or transactions only 
readable by those that you designate.
MANAGING IT ALL
We've seen how we can create a digital 
certificate so that we can inextricably bind 
a public key to a recognisable and 
accountable identity such as a person, a 
company, a software agent, or a machine. 
We've also seen how these digital
o
certificates mirror the world of paper 
certificates such as passports, in some 
ways. In this paper-based world, we are 
used to the existence of trusted agencies 
(such as the passport office or the credit 
card company), to look after the issuance, 
revocation and general management of
o o
these certificates. In the burgeoning world
o o
of electronic commerce, in order to 
manage the huge number of digital
o o o
certificates that might be in circulation, similar trustedo '
agencies must be created.
In this brief tour of the technical underpinnings of 
secure electronic commerce, we will not go into any great 
detail concerning agencies intended to manage digital 
certificates, but will briefly list them, and their functions.
PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE
The first thing to know is that the infrastructure as a 
whole that is intended to issue, manage and facilitate the7 o
use of digital certificates, is called a Public Key 
Infrastructure or PKI for short. It is a term that you are 
likely to hear many times if you become involved in secure 
electronic commerce. A PKI consists of the following 
components.
The Certificate Authority
Otherwise abbreviated as CA, this is a trusted authority, 
embodied in software (with possible hardware support), 
that is responsible for certificate management operations 
on behalf of a community of certificate users, (or as the 
American Bar Association describes them   relying 
parties). These relying parties could be people, file- 
servers, web-servers and the like, business applications, 
mobile software agents, or whatever is required to be able 
to communicate with confidentiality, integrity,
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authentication, etc. The range of certificate management 
operations undertaken by the CA encompasses certificate 
issuance, renewal, revocation, suspension, retirement, and 
archival. Under some circumstances, the CA may also be 
responsible for actually generating the key pairs used in 
the processes outlined earlier. Its primary function 
however, is to act as a trusted authority that vouches for 
the binding between an identity and a public key, and 
hence vouch for the validity of the electronic identity 
(instantiated in die public key) of any of its relying parties. 
In short, the CA is the entity that can be trusted to say to 
anyone 'This is Bob's public key'. Consequently, the keys that 
the CA uses for signing certificates (to ensure the binding 
between identity and public key) should be regarded as the 
Crown Jewels of the infrastructure and should be very 
strongly protected. If these were ever to fall into the wrong 
hands, certificates could be forged quite easily.
Optionally, the Registration Authority
This is otherwise abbreviated as RA, (or sometimes LRA 
  the L meaning Local). Again this is a trusted authority, 
embodied in software (with possible hardware support), 
but this time it is an optional component, since although 
it is commonly quite useful, some organisations 
(particularly small ones) may have little or no need for it 
(whilst other organisations may require more dian one). 
Its main role is to act as a trusted representative of the CA 
to which the CA can delegate some management 
functions. These functions being the registration of 
individuals or other entities for inclusion into the 
community of certificate users, requests for revocation, 
suspension, or update. Commonly, the RA software is 
used by an authorised individual from the community 
being served, (such as someone from the personnel 
department of a company), whose job it is to ensure that 
sufficient proof of identity and eligibility is produced 
before a certificate is issued. Consequently, rather than the 
CA, which is a central resource, the RA is usually located 
where it will be most useful (usually near to the 
community of certificate holders that it serves). Hence the 
RA is also known as a Local Registration Authority.
The Directory
Like a telephone directory in which the telephone 
numbers of subscribers are published, the directory 
associated with a public key infrastructure is the place 
where subscribers' digital certificates are published. 
Remember that these digital certificates contain the 
subscribers' public keys, and so the directory is the place 
to look if you want to send confidential messages to a 
subscriber, or if you want to check his or her digital 
signature. The benefit of using directories for publishing 
certificates, as opposed to any number of alternative 
methods (such as flat files, various web page formats, etc.), 
is that directory services increasingly can be accessed by a
standard mechanism that facilitates automatic access and 
processing in business software. This is called the 
Lightweight Directory Access Protocol or LDAE 
Directories are also used to publish notifications of 
certificate revocations and suspensions, and so this is also 
the place to discover if any particular certificate is still 
valid.
The Personal Security Environment
This is a term used to describe a variety of methods 
employed to protect personal secrets. In particular, the 
secrets with which we are currently most concerned are 
the private keys that have been generated as one half of the 
key pairs used in public key infrastructures, and hence 
secure electronic commerce. Some more familiar terms 
that describe individual methods of protecting these 
personal secrets are smartcards and software wallets.
These major components can be augmented by other 
optional components such as a trusted time-stamping 
service, or for instance, a recent proposal to facilitate ease 
of certificate status checking: a certificate validation
o
service.
WHAT CAN WE DO WITH THE 
TECHNOLOGY?
Any technology is only as useful as die applications to 
which it can be put. Secure e-commerce technology is no 
exception, so we must be able to demonstrate improved 
ways of doing things or enable entirely new and useful 
things to be done that could not have been accomplished 
before. In what follows, we will briefly examine some of 
die higher level facilities that can be built using secure e- 
commerce technology. These are not by themselves whatcv J
might be called business applications, but combination 
and co-ordination of such facilities by business-specific 
application code and processes, can build powerful new 
business applications.
SECURE EMAIL
Many millions of business and individuals have come to 
rely on email as a cheap and efficient form of 
communication that, in the main, works well without 
regard to differences in location or time zone. It is 
relatively easy to use and the benefits are generally well 
understood. Consequently the proportion of individuals 
and businesses becoming email-enabled is growing at a 
tremendous rate. Only now are some of the email converts 
beginning to appreciate some of the risks associated with 
the use of email.
(1) Email can easily be forged to appear to come from 
someone else.
(2) As a consequence of the previous point, anyone can 
assert that they had never sent some particular email.
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(3) Alternatively, people can assert that they never 
received some particular email.
(4) Email addresses are not sufficiently well bound to a 
real identity, so the email recipient may not be the 
intended recipient, but someone masquerading as 
such.
(5) Email can be modified in transit without anyone 
being alerted.
(6) Email in transit can be considered as though the 
message had been written on the back of a picture 
postcard. It can be read by anyone with the software 
and the motivation to read it.
Secure email mitigates or effectively removes these risks 
by using cryptographic techniques as explained earlier, 
and allows both businesses and private individuals to send 
email with a high level of confidence.
SECURE WEB ACCESS
As with email, many businesses have appreciated the 
value of having a website, whether as part of the sales 
function, for customer support, or purely as a 
promotional tool. Many of these sites have attempted to 
provide restricted access to items of value by the use of 
password-protected areas of the website. Unfortunately, 
passwords used in such a manner are effectively sent in the 
clear, that is to say, without any form of protection. 
Anyone listening to the network traffic can eavesdrop on 
password exchanges and store them for later use. As with 
email, unprotected connections to websites are open to 
attacks involving eavesdropping (sniffing), masquerading 
(spoofing), modification of data in transit, etc. Using 
secure e-commerce techniques, connections to websites 
can be strongly authenticated and protected through the 
use of digital certificates and suitable protocols such as 
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL).
SECURE EXTRA-NET ACCESS TO 
MAINFRAMES AND OTHER LEGACY 
SYSTEMS
Using secure e-commerce technology, systems can be 
deployed that allow a selected group of people or 
companies to gain access to certain resources within the 
company that would not otherwise be made available on 
the network. Such access might be provided via a website 
acting as a secure gateway to, for instance, a corporate 
database containing customer or product data. By being 
able to provide such access to selected parties such as 
important customers, suppliers, partners, etc., the 
company has created a stronger and more valuable 
relationship with them. They have effectively been given 
partial access to the inner sanctum of the company so that 
certain aspects of business can be conducted more 
efficiently and cheaply, or that new elements of business 
are now enabled. These extremely close working
relationships with individuals or businesses outside our 
own companies can be enabled with great effect and a 
tight control on security, by using public key 
infrastructures as an underpinning.
VIRTUAL PRIVATE NETWORKS
Where a company's network is not connected to the 
internet, for example, and only authorised company 
employees have access to resources on that network, this 
might be called the company's private network. In such an 
environment, resources may be deployed and activities 
allowed that would certainly not be allowed if the 
company network were to be connected to the internet. 
Using new secure and standard protocols such as IPSEC, 
which has been developed in the Internet Engineering 
Task Force (IETF), it becomes possible to secure 
connections from one person or application to another, 
regardless of the type of network that connects them 
together. Thus, whether directly connected to the 
company private network or via the internet from halfway 
around the world, that network connection can, to all 
intents and purposes, be considered private to the 
company. The connection is protected from public 
scrutiny by using digital certificates and cryptographic 
techniques explained earlier. In essence, connections 
established using such techniques can be considered to be 
on the private network, or as it is commonly described, 
connected via a virtual private network. As an example of 
how this might be applied: a salesman in a hotel room in 
some foreign country can connect to the internet by 
dialling the local access number of his internet service
o
provider. If he then sets up a virtual private network 
connection to head office over the internet, (using IPSEC 
for example), he can work just as if he were actually in the 
office.
ACCESS TO COMPUTERS
It is typically the case that in many large organisations, 
employees need access to several computers in order to 
be able to carry out their jobs. In some cases, access may 
be required on an ad hoc basis to say, thirty different 
computers, (databases, file-servers, accounts systems, 
etc.). Each of these computers may be password 
protected, so the poor employee has to memorise and 
manage up to thirty usernames and passwords.
SECURE PAYMENTS
Most people would understand that payment 
information (credit card numbers, account transfer 
information with authorisation codes, etc.), should not be 
exchanged without an appropriate level of security being 
involved. Secure e-commerce techniques have been 
developed that enable financial information to be 
exchanged in a safe manner. Many websites are now 
supporting the exchange of credit card information by 
protecting them with secure protocols such as SSL.
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However the credit card companies themselves have been 
working on a credit card specific protocol to enable 
widespread and secure purchasing over the internet (SET 
  Secure Electronic Transaction). Due to the difficulty of 
building and managing completely interoperable 
deployments however, this protocol is not being taken up 
as quickly as the designers had hoped. On a related note, 
various other secure protocols have been designed to cater 
for sector-specific requirements or to integrate payments 
as just one phase of a much larger 'buying process'. These 
include such proposals as FIX (Financial Information 
eXchange), OBI (Open Buying Initiative), BIPS (Banking 
Internet Payment System), OFX (Open Financial 
eXchange), OTP (Open Trading Protocol), and others.
10
Any technology is only as useful as the applications to 
which it can be put. Secure e-commerce technology is 
no exception, so we must be able to demonstrate 
improved ways of doing things or enable entirely new 
and useful things to be done that could not have been 
accomplished before.
SINGLE SIGN-ON
It is typically the case that in many large organisations, 
employees need access to several computers in order to be 
able to carry out their jobs. In some cases, access may be 
required on an ad hoc basis to say, thirty different 
computers, (databases, file-servers, accounts systems, 
etc.). Each of these computers may be password 
protected, so the poor employee has to memorise and 
manage up to thirty usernames and passwords. This is 
extremely difficult and in many cases, passwords have been 
found written on sticky notes, attached to employees' 
screens. Any security offered by the passwords has just 
been rendered useless. One might suggest that merely 
setting all of an employee's passwords to be the same 
would solve this problem. However, in practice this is 
usually not possible because each system to be used may 
have different format requirements for usernames and 
passwords, and different criteria for password ageing and 
update. A further problem is that typically in organisations, 
an employee's job description will change from time to 
time, or employees leave, get hired, get promoted, or get 
transferred. All of this means that access to a different set 
of computers is required and user accounts need to be 
updated. Organisations can spend large amounts of money 
and time on merely managing this constant change. If some 
way were to be provided such that employees only had to 
sign-on once, to the company, and that after that, resources 
were to be made available according to assigned rights, the 
password management problem could be significantly 
reduced. Some products are beginning to appear on the 
market that now take advantage of the unique and secure 
identity offered by digital certificates, to provide such a
single sign-on capability. This digital identity can be made 
portable and able to be carried around with the employee, 
in a personal security environment (such as a smartcard or 
software wallet) as described earlier.
AGENTS AND DOWNLOADABLE CODE
The download of unknown software has been an issue 
for some time. Most people will have heard of computer 
viruses and the havoc they can wreak on a company. A 
virus, however, is just one class of a range of malicious 
software that can do harm to your company. Furthermore, 
it is not just malicious software that should be guarded 
against: the use of untested unknown software (as can beo v
downloaded from millions of sites on the internet) can 
cause just as much damage through faults (bugs) in the 
software. In some cases, you may not even know you have 
downloaded some code. Many websites, for instance, 
automatically cause the download of Java or ActiveX 
software to your computer, or plug-ins to handle the 
newest multimedia format. Software programs can be 
viewed merely as data, just as an email message or 
document. Consequently, it is possible to apply a digital 
signature to software programs, as was explained earlier 
with respect to email messages and arbitrary data files. 
Digital signatures can be used to provide authentication of 
the source of the software, and to show that the software 
has not been tampered with, since being issued by its 
author. With such protection in place, policies can be set
up and enforced with regards to what software and fromr o
which sources, downloads will be allowed.
New secure e-commerce facilities are being discussed 
and developed all the time. For example, there is some 
interest in the development of trusted on-line negotiation 
facilities. The idea is to support the notion of several 
parties collaborating over the network to negotiate mutual 
agreement. Naturally, authentication of identity, and 
protection from repudiation will be important in such an 
environment, as would confidentiality and integrity 
protection. ®
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